Based on a transparent analytical model of multiple markets including corn, ethanol, gasoline, and transportation fuel, this study estimates the welfare changes for consumers and producers resulting from ethanol production and related support polices in 2007. The welfare estimation takes into account the secondbest gain from eliminating loan deficiency payments. The results suggest the total social cost is about $0.78 billion for given market parameters. We validate the model's underlying assumption and test for the results' sensitivity to assumed parameters. 
Introduction
The ethanol industry in the United States receives support on several different fronts.
There are three major categories:
1. Budgetary support measures, including a 51¢-per-gallon tax credit to refiners blending ethanol with gasoline. This is scheduled to fall to 45¢ in January 2009. 2. A renewable fuel standard (RFS) that requires U.S. fuel producers to blend into gasoline at least a certain amount of renewable fuel, ranging from 9 billion gallons in 2008 to 36 billion gallons by 2022.
3. Trade restrictions, including a 2.5% ad valorem tariff and a per unit tariff of 54¢ per gallon.
The benefits and pitfalls of this level of government support have been at the center of recent debate.
In this study we investigate the distribution of welfare gains and losses from the ethanol blenders tax credit among producers and consumers in the corn, ethanol, gasoline, and fuel markets and estimate the overall welfare impact of the U.S. ethanol subsidy. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to include the impact of ethanol on the gasoline market, and to acknowledge in a multimarket framework that prior to the existence of a large ethanol industry, commodity markets were already in a second-best situation.
There are an increasing number of studies on the topic. Babcock simulates the welfare impacts of various government ethanol policies in a model of multiple integrated markets.
He finds that U.S. ethanol policy induces a large welfare transfer from taxpayers and nonethanol corn users to corn producers, fuel blenders, and ethanol producers, as well as large associated net welfare loss. Gardner uses a vertical market model of corn, ethanol, and by-products and compares welfare effects of the government subsidy on corn through deficiency payments and the government subsidy on ethanol produced from corn. He finds that the net deadweight loss of the corn and ethanol subsidies is likely to be in the billions of dollars annually. The deadweight loss of the ethanol subsidy is much higher than that of deficiency payments. This conclusion is based on the assumption that the corn price increases by only 4¢ from the ethanol subsidy, an amount that is much lower than we use below. Schmitz, Moss, and Schmitz calculate the impact of ethanol subsidies on corn used for ethanol and indicate that the treasury cost of the ethanol tax credit is about $1.0 billion lower than the cost of direct payment to corn farmers. Taheripour and Tyner find that the share of the ethanol subsidy received by ethanol producers (1) increases with the elasticity of substitution between ethanol and gasoline and also with the proportion of ethanol blended in fuel, and (2) decreases with the price elasticity of ethanol. They conclude that the ethanol industry is, and will continue to be, in a good position to capture the ethanol credit regardless of its current share.
Our paper differs from the existing literature in several important ways. First, we develop an analytical model explicit in its accounting of ethanol, gasoline, and fuel markets.
1 Second, we estimate the welfare impacts on agricultural and energy markets, and on overall welfare change after accounting for reduced loan deficiency payments. We estimate welfare changes by both traditional consumer (producer) surplus formulas and the compensating variation measure. Finally, we validate the model's underlying assumptions and test for sensitivity of the main results to market parameters.
The Analytical Model
In the model, the corn market includes ethanol and non-ethanol demand and corn supply. The fuel market includes gasoline and ethanol separately to disentangle the relationship between these markets and better capture the substitution effect of ethanol on gasoline. We provide a graphical illustration of the corresponding welfare changes in terms of consumer and producer surplus. This study does not explicitly evaluate the impact of the import tariff or the consumption mandate, because the import tariff is so similar in magnitude to the blenders credit. Imported Brazilian ethanol is subject to the 54¢ import tariff but then benefits from the 51¢ blenders credit so these two approximately offset each other. We ignore the ethanol mandate because it was not binding in the base period since high energy prices encouraged ethanol production to grow beyond the ethanol mandate that was in place that year. Also, we have not considered the impact of induced higher prices of other crops. It seems likely that consumers of these other crops lost and producers gained and loan deficiency payments fell as a result of ethanol subsidies. We also ignore the possible environmental benefits or costs of ethanol production and consumption.
Corn Market
Consider the standard supply and demand model for corn graphically depicted in In the right panel of figure 2 , supply in the gasoline market is given by g S . Without the ethanol tax credit t , equilibrium prices are nf e P and g P in the two respective markets.
Ethanol demand for fuel use is zero at this original equilibrium price. The amount of ethanol that will be supplied for fuel at prices higher than represents the "wasted" portion of the tax credit, which is used to make the ethanol production economically feasible, and is referred to as "water" by de Gorter and Just. Although qualitative relations exist among these three components, the specific cut-off points vary over time and critically depend on corn and crude oil prices.
Welfare Estimates
Given the annual market data and assumed parameters, as shown in table 1, the net welfare loss in the U.S. corn market is approximately $2.12 billion, as presented in table We calibrate the model to 2007 market data of price and production, which are also reported in table 1. There are three important price changes for the welfare analysis: (1) the reduction in the fuel price, g f P P − , which is estimated as $0.14 in Du and Hayes; (2) the increase in the corn price, ' C C P P − , which is $1.27 as reported in Tokgoz et al.; and (3) the price change in the ethanol market, 
Sensitivity Analysis
Gardner and Tyner point out that elasticity assumption is critical for the evaluation of welfare changes since these parameters summarize the price responsiveness to policy interventions. In order to test for the sensitivity of our welfare estimates on these assumptions, we evaluate the overall welfare gains for the given ranges of demand and supply elasticities of corn and gasoline markets. The results are depicted in figures 3 and 4. The net welfare loss varies from $0.22 billion to $1.38 billion, as corn demand and supply elasticities vary in the given ranges. Similarly, the net welfare loss is in the range of $0.21 billion to $1.36 billion, as elasticities of gasoline change.
It has been established that an ordinary consumer surplus measure requires a restrictive path-independence condition on the utility function and constant marginal utility of income so as to ensure its uniqueness as a money measure (Just, Hueth, and Schmitz, p. 136 
Conclusion
Government support policies coupled with high energy prices stimulated a rapid increase in ethanol production and associated welfare transfers in multiple markets. We find that the net welfare change of the U.S. ethanol subsidy is negative, a result that is robust with respect to a reasonable range of alternative parameter values. The markets for agricultural commodities were not competitive prior to large-scale ethanol production because there was already significant intervention in the form of farm subsidies. Our results show that subsidizing U.S. ethanol production generated a small aggregate welfare loss while also reducing the distortion associated with farm payments. 
